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In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ("ADEA")1 to help secure employment opportunities for
the elderly. Though by its terms the Act clearly prohibits unions as
well as employers from discriminating on the basis of age, it does
not explicitly provide that unions may be held liable for damages.
Federal courts have diverged in determining union liability under
the Act. Some have denied liability altogether, construing the en-
forcement section of the ADEA to incorporate the substantive pro-
vision in the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")2 that limits lia-
bility to employers.' Under a second approach, courts have
concentrated on the broad language in the ADEA authorizing
courts to "grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropri-
ate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]." Reasoning that liabil-
ity for damages will deter union discrimination and thus "effectu-
ate" the goals of the Act, these courts have imposed monetary
t B.A. 1984, Florida State University; J.D. 1989, The University of Chicago.
1 29 USC § 621 et seq (1982).
2 29 USC § 201, 216(b) (1982).
3 This first approach to the ADEA is illustrated by Air Line Pilots Association v Trans
World Airlines, 713 F2d 940 (2d Cir 1983), and Neuman v Northwest Airlines, 28 FEP
Cases (BNA) 1488 (ND Ill 1982). In ALPA v TWA, the union and employer negotiated an
age-based promotion policy that discriminated against older pilots. The court found that the
union had violated the ADEA, but refused to hold it liable for monetary damages. 713 F2d
at 957. In Neuman, the plaintiff alleged that the union had participated in negotiating a
mandatory retirement provision that violated the ADEA. The court granted the union's mo-
tion for summary judgment, expressly disregarding the broad remedial language in the
ADEA. 28 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1489 n 1.
29 USC § 626(b).
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liability on unions violating the ADEA.5
Neither of these two approaches is a proper treatment of
union liability under the ADEA. The first employs a wooden inter-
pretation of the Act's enforcement provision, disregarding language
in the same section of the Act. It is a piece-meal approach, lacking
a coherent, comprehensive resolution of the Act's substantive and
enforcement provisions. Indeed, this interpretation hinders the ex-
press purpose of the Act: protecting workers from age discrimina-
tion. Courts taking the second approach do attempt a purposive
interpretation of the ADEA, but their analyses of the statute re-
main superficial. In particular, these courts provide no guidelines
for limiting judicial discretion in the selection of remedies.
This comment develops a doctrinal basis for assessing backpay
damages against unions that have violated the ADEA. Section I
discusses the support that the language and history of the Act fur-
nish for imposing monetary liability on unions. Section II analyzes
the language, history, and case law of the FLSA, on which the en-
forcement provisions of the ADEA are based. This section also dis-
cusses federal court decisions interpreting the Equal Pay Act of
1963 ("EPA"), another amendment to the FLSA proscribing cer-
tain discriminatory conduct by unions. Section III examines the
evolving federal labor law doctrine of the duty of fair representa-
tion, demonstrating that courts treat age discrimination by unions
less seriously under the ADEA than under labor law. Section IV
proposes construing the ADEA to allow backpay awards against
unions in private enforcement actions.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE ADEA
A. The Language of the Statute
Congress had several objectives in enacting the ADEA, among
them promoting the employment of older persons based on their
ability alone, prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in employ-
5 Cases illustrative of this second approach are U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v Air Line Pilots Assn., 489 F Supp 1003 (D Minn 1980), and Boiero v
Cuyahoga County Library Union, 1988 US Dist LEXIS 9266 (N D Ohio). The union in
EEOC v ALPA negotiated a contract provision giving pilots nearing retirement age less
favorable vacation benefits than younger pilots. The court ruled that the union had violated
the ADEA and held it liable for lost compensation. 489 F Supp at 1009. In Boiero, the
plaintiff alleged that the union had refused to take her grievance to arbitration because of
her age and national origin. The union moved for summary judgment on the ground that it
could not be held liable under the ADEA. The court disagreed and denied the motion. 1988
US Dist LEXIS 9266 at 9-10.
6 29 USC § 206(d) (1982).
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ment, and coordinating the efforts of employers and workers to
meet age-related employment problems.' Generally, the Act pro-
hibits employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations
from discriminating on the basis of age against persons over forty,'
unless the differential treatment fits one of several statutory ex-
emptions.9 Labor unions are specifically prohibited from engaging
in certain discriminatory conduct. They cannot exclude an individ-
ual from union membership because of her age. They cannot clas-
sify or segregate members on the basis of age in a manner that
denies workers employment opportunities. And finally, a union
cannot "cause or attempt to cause" an employer to discriminate
against an employee on the basis of her age.10 In drafting the
ADEA, Congress borrowed language from a variety of statutes. The
result was a "hybrid" statute, with substantive provisions nearly
identical to some in Title VII" and enforcement provisions com-
bining components of Title VII and the FLSA.12 It is the ADEA's
relationship with the FLSA that has caused courts special trouble
in determining union liability.
Congress stipulated that the Act be enforced "in accordance
with the powers, remedies, and procedures" of selected sections of
the FLSA.1' However, Congress significantly modified the remedial
framework of the FLSA to suit what it regarded as problems pecu-
liar to age discrimination. Believing that age discrimination arose
less from invidious prejudice than from ignorance of older workers'
capabilities and a societal emphasis on youth, Congress made con-
ciliation and education the preferred means of enforcement."'
7 29 USC § 621(b).
8 29 USC § 631(a).
9 29 USC §§ 623(f)(1)-(3), 630(b). Exemptions include cases where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification or is a component of a bona fide seniority system or pension plan.
10 29 USC § 623(c)(3).
21 42 USC § 2000e et seq (1982). Compare Title VII's provisions forbidding discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin at 42 USC § 2000e-2(c) with
the ADEA provisions at 29 USC § 623(c).
11 Section 626(b) of the ADEA provides that the Act "shall be enforced in accordance
with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 11(b), 16 (except for subsec-
tion (a) thereof), and 17 of the [FLSA], as amended ... and subsection (c) of [section 626 of
the ADEA]." The section also contains language comparable to Title VII's provisions at 42
USC § 2000e-5(g), providing that in ADEA actions a court "shall have jurisdiction to grant
such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this [stat-
ute], including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or pro-
motion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or un-
paid overtime compensation. . .
11 See note 12.
14 Department of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment 1-2 (1965), reprinted in Hearings on HR 10634 and Similar Bills before the Select
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Thus, like the FLSA, the ADEA has a dual enforcement sys-
tem that allows both the Secretary of Labor 5 and private litigants
to bring actions under the Act. Unlike the FLSA, however, the
ADEA requires private litigants to notify the Secretary 60 days
before initiating the lawsuit. 6 This notification gives the Secretary
the opportunity to eliminate the discrimination through "concilia-
tion, conference, and persuasion. ' '17
Section 7(b) of the ADEA, like the FLSA provisions, states
that "amounts owing" to a person as a result of a violation of the
Act are deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or overtime compen-
sation."8 However, the ADEA enforcement scheme employs a mod-
ified version of the FLSA's liquidated damages provision. Under
the FLSA, liquidated damages are granted as a matter of right
once a violation is shown.'8 Under the ADEA, liquidated damages
are available only for "willful violations. 2 0 This difference reflects
the statutes' divergent purposes. Liquidated damages are given
under the FLSA to ensure that plaintiffs are fully compensated in
cases where damages are not easily calculated.2' Under the ADEA,
however, liquidated damages have taken on a punitive character
because of the elimination of criminal penalties.22
Two other modifications of the FLSA are notable. First, as
just noted, Congress chose not to incorporate the criminal penal-
ties of the FLSA into the ADEA. Apparently, Congress wanted to
encourage employers and unions to rectify age discrimination
problems voluntarily and believed that conciliatory actions would
be more likely without the threat of criminal sanctions.2 3
Second, and of particular significance, Congress included the
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th Cong, 1st
Sess 56 (remarks of Rep O'Hara); id at 57-58 (remarks of Rep Hathaway and Sen Javits).
11 Responsibility for enforcing the ADEA was originally given to the Secretary of La-
bor, but was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") by
the Reorganization Plan Number 1 of 1978, § 2, 43 Fed Reg 19807 (1978). This comment
refers to the Secretary and the EEOC interchangeably.
1s 29 USC § 626(b).
17 Id.
18 Id (ADEA) and 29 USC § 216 (b) (FLSA).
19 29 USC § 216 (b).
20 29 USC § 626 (b).
21 See Brooklyn Savings Bank v O'Neil, 324 US 697, 707 (1945).
22 See Trans World Airlines v Thurston, 469 US 111, 125 (1985). Senator Javits, the
primary sponsor of the ADEA, suggested that the bill include a liquidated damages remedy
as a substitute for criminal penalties to punish willful offenders. Id.
23 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Hearings on S 830, S 788 before the
Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong,
1st Sess 24-25 (1967) (remarks of Sen Javits).
1090 [56:1087
Union Liability Under ADEA
following provision in § 7 of the ADEA: "In any action brought to
enforce this [Act] the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of [the statute]. ... ." This comment will argue that this
provision authorizes the courts to choose among the full range of
traditional remedies in redressing a particular ADEA violation.
Congress recognized that the remedial provisions of the FLSA were
not perfectly suited to the age discrimination context, and thus
gave courts the flexibility to address any disparities that might
arise.15
A final important difference between the FLSA and the ADEA
enforcement provisions involves the entities subject to liability
under each. Section 16(b) of the FLSA states that any employer
found in violation of the statute will be held liable;26 labor organi-
zations are explicitly excluded from the statute's definition of em-
ployer.27 In contrast, § 7(b) of the ADEA contains no express limi-
tation of liability to employers. But because that provision states
that the Act shall be enforced in accordance with the "powers,
remedies, and procedures" of the FLSA,2 s courts have disagreed
over whether the ADEA's remedial provisions do in fact apply to
29unions.
The next section explores the legislative history of the ADEA
to determine whether the historical record can resolve the uncer-
tainty regarding application of the ADEA to labor unions.
B. The Legislative History of the ADEA
The legislative history of the ADEA does not conclusively re-
solve the question of union liability under the Act. It shows, how-
ever, that the aspects of the Act suggestive of a Congressional in-
tent to bar union liability were the result, not of purposeful
considerations of the merits of liability, but of practical concerns
for administration of the Act as a whole.
Congress began considering the problem of age discrimination
2.4 29 USC § 626(b).
11 See Koyen v Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 560 F Supp 1161, 1168 (S D
NY 1983) (construing ADEA to allow courts to fashion remedies beyond those authorized in
the FLSA in order to fully compensate plaintiff for economic losses). See also J. Hardin
Marion, Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
45 Md L Rev 298, 324 (1986).
26 29 USC § 216(b).
27 29 USC § 203(d).
28 29 USC § 626(b).
29 See notes 3 and 5.
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in employment while deliberating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,30 when several legislators advocated including age discrim-
ination within the compass of the Act Various practical concerns
blocked inclusion,32 but in Title VII Congress mandated that the
Department of Labor study the "factors which might tend to result
in discrimination in employment because of age and of the conse-
quences of such discrimination on the economy and individuals af-
fected."33 In 1965 the Labor Department study was released.34 It
concluded that age discrimination was serious and widespread, and
that non-statutory methods of dealing with it had been ineffectual.
It confirmed that age discrimination resulted from general misun-
derstandings about the abilities of older workers rather than from
invidious prejudice. And it called for federal legislation prohibiting
arbitrary age discrimination.3 5
On the heels of the Labor Department study, members of
Congress and the executive branch introduced several bills aimed
at age discrimination in employment. The Johnson Administra-
tion's proposal36 included an enforcement scheme similar to that
established by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA");3 7 it
would have created a new administrative agency within the De-
partment of Labor possessing prosecutorial and qua~i-judicial pow-
ers. A competitor bill was Senate bill 788,11 sponsored by Senator
Javits, which proposed to address age discrimination by amending
30 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
31 HR 10144, 87th Cong, 2d Sess (February 21, 1962) included a provision specifically
outlawing age discrimination in employment. In reporting the bill, the House Committee on
Education and Labor noted that "[t]he committee sees no reason to treat such arbitrary
denial [on the basis of age] in any substantially different fashion from other employment
discrimination." Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1962, HR Rep No 87-1370, 87th
Cong, 2d Sess 7 (1962).
32 Some proponents of Title VII feared that inclusion of age discrimination would hin-
der passage of the bill. HR Rep No 87-1370 at 17 (cited in note 31) (supplemental views of
members of the House Labor Committee). They argued that the EEOC, created to adminis-
ter Title VII, could not adequately handle all types of discrimination cases, and that a pro-
hibition on age discrimination would consequently be underenforced. Id at 18 (statement of
Herbert Hill, NAACP). Other Title VII supporters claimed that age discrimination had
been insufficiently studied and that any legislation addressing it would be premature. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 3167 (1968) (remarks of Rep Celler); id at 3169 (remarks of Rep
Waggoner).
" The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 715, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, 265 (1964).
" Department of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment (1965) (cited in note 14).
Id at 225-26.
" S 830, 90th Cong, 1st Sess (February 3, 1967).
" 29 USC §§ 151-169 (1982).
'8 S 788, 90th Cong, 1st Sess (February 1, 1967).
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the FLSA. This bill gave enforcement powers to the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, the section already re-
sponsible for administering the Equal Pay Act.3 9
In 1967, S 788 was passed as the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act. Several factors account for its success, nearly all ad-
ministrative. ADEA placing the responsibility of enforcing the Act
in the hands of an established agency saved Congress the burden
of creating an entirely new bureaucracy. The drafters also believed
that industry compliance would be easier and more likely, since
employers and employees were already familiar with the proce-
dures of the Wage and Hour Division.40 The bill provided a judicial
forum for age discrimination claims. Supporters of the bill had
feared that an administrative proceeding might not guarantee an
impartial determination of liability, especially when the agency
was also exercising prosecutorial powers.4' Finally, the bill by-
passed the EEOC. Senator Javits, the primary sponsor of S 788,
had noted that the Commission was years behind in disposing of
its docket,42 and was concerned that the long delays would be par-
ticularly harmful to the claims of older workers. In addition, some
supporters of the bill stated that age discrimination required
unique expertise, distinct from that required by the other forms of
discrimination with which the EEOC was familiar.43
The legislative history of the ADEA yields no express refer-
ence to holding unions liable for damages. In adopting S 788 over
its competitors, Congress did reject proposals that expressly held
unions liable for damages for age discrimination.44 But the bill's
3' Another proposed age discrimination bill was patterned on Title VII and would have
given the EEOC the power to enforce the age discrimination prohibitions. HR 9338, 89th
Cong, 1st Sess (August 25, 1965). See Hearings on HR 10634 and Similar Bills before the
Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th
Cong, 1st Sess 5 (1965).
10 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Hearings on S 830 and S 788 before
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong, 1st Sess 24 (1967) (statement
of Sen Javits); id at 96 (statement of Andrew J. Briemiller, AFL-CIO).
11 Id at 323-24 (statement of National Association of Manufacturers).
42 113 Cong Rec 7076 (March 16, 1967) (statement of Sen Javits).
" Hearings on HR 10634 and Similar Bills, 89th Cong, 1st Sess at 56 (cited in note 14)
(statement of Rep O'Hara). See also 113 Cong Rec 34747 (December 4, 1967) (remarks of
Rep Dent). The agency chosen to enforce the ADEA, the Wage and Hour Division, was only
familiar with sex discrimination, so the validity of the "expertise" rationale is questionable.
11 Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz indicated that unions, employment agencies,
and employers could all be held liable for damages under the administration's bill (S 830/
HR 4221). Age Discrimination in Employment, Hearings on HR 3651, HR 3768, and HR
4221 before the House Committee on Education and Labor, General Subcommittee on La-
bor, 90th Cong, 1st Sess at 12 (1967) (remarks of Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz). See
also HR 9338, 89th Cong, 1st Sess (cited in note 14).
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language leaves no doubt that Congress regarded unions as a part
of the age discrimination problem. Indeed, Congress rejected the
testimony of several union officials who had urged exclusion of un-
ions from the substantive provisions of the Act as well.45
The legislative history of the ADEA shows that when Congress
adopted the FLSA as a model for the ADEA's remedial provisions,
it did not weigh the different purposes of the two acts, or the con-
sequences of selective incorporation of FLSA provisions. Rather,
Congress was concerned with creating a remedial scheme that
would be efficient and easy to administer, and the FLSA satisfied
both of these requirements. Thus, one cannot conclude that in
choosing the FLSA's remedial provisions, Congress meant to incor-
porate all the policies and practices embodied in the FLSA. In-
deed, the next section will show that such a conclusion would be
mistaken, since the drafters of the ADEA had a much less benign
view of unions than the legislators who drafted the FLSA twenty
years before.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE FLSA
Courts refusing to impose monetary liability on unions that
have violated the ADEA generally base their decision on the Act's
incorporation of the remedial provisions of the FLSA.4 e Since the
FLSA's backpay liability is limited to employers, these courts rea-
son, the ADEA's must be as well. A careful analysis of the FLSA
itself illustrates that this interpretation is unjustified.
A. The Context of the FLSA
The FLSA was a pro-labor New Deal measure passed in the
aftermath of the NLRA.41 Concerned that industry hostility would
obstruct the widespread organization of labor, Congress had sought
through the NLRA to encourage collective bargaining and thereby
protect the welfare of the working class. The FLSA, enacted three
years after the NLRA, extended the earlier statute by establishing
a minimum wage and maximum hour limit to benefit employees of
certain industries.48
"I Hearings on S 830 and S 788 before the Subcommittee on Labor (statement of An-
drew J. Biemiller, AFL-CIO) (cited in note 23).
4" See note 3 and accompanying text.
" See 29 USC § 151.
48 The FLSA was the third in a series of pro-labor statutes, the first being the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 USC §§ 101-115 (1982) (prohibiting the use of injunctions to
forbid peaceful collective action) and the second being the NLRA.
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Supporters of the FLSA claimed that it would serve two pur-
poses. First, it would extend the benefits of collective bargaining to
the lowest class of workers who did not have the ability to organ-
ize.49 Second, the bill would preserve the progress unions had
achieved by protecting employers who had negotiated with labor to
eliminate unfair wage competition.50
The FLSA was not designed to aid wage earners who were
themselves capable of negotiating for adequate working conditions.
In fact, § 5 of the original bill expressly exempted collective bar-
gaining agreements from its scope." Senator Walsh, a primary
sponsor of the bill, stated, "This bill is not concerned about wage
earners that can protect their rights through collective bargaining.
It excludes them from its provisions. It is only the lowest unpro-
tected and unorganized wage earner that it seeks to protect from
exploitation. 5 2 Given the stated purposes of the statute, it made
sense that only employers could be held liable under the FLSA. Its
provisions were inapplicable to unions.
Following the passage of the FLSA, organized labor gained in
strength.53 Realizing that a powerful union could restrict employ-
ees' rights as well as protect them, Congress passed a series of laws
designed to curb potential union abuse.5 4 And when Congress be-
gan passing anti-discrimination legislation in the 1960's, the enact-
ments explicitly covered unions as well as employers. In 1963, for
example, Congress amended the FLSA with the Equal Pay Act
("EPA"),55 which prohibited unions and employers from discrimi-
nating on the basis of sex in the payment of wages. Title VII of the
"' Fair Labor Standards Act, S Rep No 75-884, 75th Cong, 1st Sess 3-4 (1937) (state-
ment of Sen Black); 81 Cong Rec 7799 (July 29, 1937) (remarks of Sen Walsh).
S Rep No 75-884 at 7; 81 Cong Rec at 7800.
S Rep No 75-884 at 7.
52 81 Cong Rec at 7800.
" Unions demonstrated their strength after World War II by disrupting the economy
through a wave of strikes resulting in the loss of a record number of man-days. These strikes
provided the impetus for regulatory legislation. See Russell A. Smith, et al, Labor Relations
Law 38-40 (Michie, 7th ed 1979).
"' The first statute passed was the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 USC
§§ 141-169, 171-197. The LMRA, unlike the NLRA, adopted a neutral stance toward labor
organizations. The statute protected the employee's right to refrain from collective activities
as well as to participate in them. 29 USC § 157. The LMRA also outlawed certain union
activities such as secondary boycotts, 29 USC §§ 158(b)(4)(A)-(B), and jurisdictional strikes,
29 USC § 158(b)(4)(D). In 1959, Congress passed the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 USC §§ 401-531 (1982), which regulated the internal affairs
of unions and established a "bill of rights" for union members.
" 29 USC § 206(d).
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Civil Rights Act of 196456 proscribed union discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.5 7 Finally, the
ADEA, with substantive provisions mirroring those of Title VII,
prohibited unions from engaging in age discrimination."
The historical development of the labor movement suggests
that the FLSA was not applied to unions because of their weakness
at the time the statute was drafted. By the time the ADEA was
passed, union power had increased considerably, and their capacity
for abuse had grown accordingly. Thus, unlike the FLSA, the
ADEA was drafted to handle misconduct by unions as well as em-
ployers. Courts that confine monetary liability under the ADEA to
the employer liability provided by the FLSA ignore the growth in
union power that occurred in the intervening years, and that the
ADEA was partly meant to address.
B. The EPA as an Analogy for the ADEA
The EPA and ADEA are both amendments to the FLSA, and
both prohibit discriminatory conduct by unions. Cases and com-
mentary on union liability under the EPA provide valuable analo-
gies for consideration of union liability under the ADEA 9
The EPA prohibits labor organizations from causing or at-
tempting to cause an employer to discriminate in the payment of
wages against any employee on the basis of sex.6 0 Like the ADEA,
it is enforced in accordance with the remedial provisions of the
FLSA. Although the EPA contains no specific provisions for direct
suits by employees, it does allow the government to recover dam-
ages from unions and distribute the money to the affected
employees."'
The legislative history of the EPA indicates that Congress in-
tended unions to be financially responsible for statutory violations.
During the House debates on the statute, it was observed that "if a
union ... is in any way at fault in maintaining a discriminatory
wage rate, [it] should be subject to all the penalties [provided in]
6 42 USC 2000e et seq (cited in note 11).
" 42 USC 2000e-2(c)(2).
" 29 USC § 623(c).
9 Commentary on the Equal Pay Act includes: Note, Remedies Against Unions Under
the Equal Pay Act: The Role of the Court, 31 Md L Rev 365 (1971); Nancy R. Heinen,
Union Liability for Discrimination in Collective Bargaining Agreements After Northwest
Airlines, 5 Harv Women's L J 143 (1982); Note, Union Liability for Sex Discrimination, 23
Hastings L J 295 (1971); Riccucci, 65 U Detroit L Rev 379.
80 29 USC § 206(d)(2). The ADEA contains a similar provision. See 29 USC § 623(c).
29 USC §§ 206(d)(3), 216(c).
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the [FLSA]." 6' 2 The draftsmen inserted the union liability provi-
sion after industry leaders pointed out that unions often negoti-
ated differential wage rates."' The leaders had pointed to the un-
ions' role in negotiating pay differentials in the hopes that
differentials included in collective bargaining agreements would be
made statutorily exempt; they argued that since workers relied on
unions to determine what provisions were in their best interest, a
union-negotiated wage differential must be acceptable to the statu-
torily protected class. Congress rejected this suggestion, drafting
the statute so as to place an affirmative obligation on unions to
change existing agreements and to negotiate future contracts in ac-
cordance with the EPA.6 4
Considering the purpose of the EPA and its proponents' advo-
cacy of union liability, inclusion of the Act within the pro-labor
FLSA might seem puzzling. But the legislative history provides an
answer-Congress wanted to employ an existing bureaucracy to
administer its new Act. Congress would later use a similar ration-
ale to justify the inclusion of the ADEA within the FLSA. Because
the Wage and Hour Division in the Department of Labor was fa-
miliar with wage laws, and both industry and affected employees
had dealt with the procedures of the Division regularly, compliance
with the EPA was expected to be facilitated. 5 And though engraft-
ing the EPA on the FLSA clouded the issue of union liability
under the Act, Congress did not address the matter itself, leaving
it to the courts instead.6
The Supreme Court has never decided whether a union can be
held liable for monetary damages in an action brought by an em-
ployee under the EPA. 7 While some lower federal courts have
12 Summary of Remarks by Rep. O'Hara in Bureau of National Affairs, Equal Pay for
Equal Work: The Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 22 (1963) (emphasis added) (available
remedies include employee wage suits, wage suits and injunction actions by the Secretary of
Labor, and criminal actions by the Justice Department for willful violations).
63 Id at 64-67.
64 109 Cong Rec 8698 (1963) (remarks by Reps O'Hara and Goodell).
11 Id. See generally, Note, 23 Hastings L J at 300 (cited in note 59) (discussing Con-
gress's belief, in enacting the EPA, that as an amendment to the FLSA the statute would be
the "easiest and most efficient course of action," and noting that inclusion of the act within
the FLSA undermined much of the EPA's effectiveness).
"' See generally Note, 23 Hastings L J at 310 (cited in note 59). See also note 62 (legis-
lators assumed that employees would have full range of FLSA remedies available to them in
suits against unions; they did not expressly recognize any potential problems under the
FLSA).
'7 The Court specifically refused to decide this issue in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v
Transport Workers, 451 US 77, 88-89 n 20 (1981).
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barred union liability under the Act,6 8 in Hodgson v Sagner, Inc.,69
the Fourth Circuit affirmed a District Court decision holding a
union jointly and severally liable for backpay under the EPA. The
union in Sagner had negotiated a sexually discriminatory wage dif-
ferential. The next year, when the employer agreed to correct the
disparity, the union insisted that only a quarter of the remedial
funds go to the female employees, and that the remainder be paid
to the male employees as a general pay increase. The union's plan
effectively perpetuated the discriminatory wage disparity. The Dis-
trict Court held that the union's actions proved its intent to dis-
criminate, noting that the causal connection between the union's
conduct and the discrimination was clear. Based on these facts, the
court concluded that the union could be held liable for damages in
the form of backpay. °
In determining union liability, the Sagner court did not un-
dertake a detailed analysis of the remedial provisions of the FLSA.
Instead, it held that it had the equitable power to order this relief
despite the absence of an express mandate in the EPA.71
The result in Sagner is supported by the EPA interpretive
regulations issued by the Department of Labor:
It is our opinion that the [EPA], in requiring that no labor
organization, or its agents, . . . "shall cause or attempt to
cause such an employer to discriminate against an employee
in violation of the equal pay provisions," is indicative of the
legislative intent that the elimination of the wage rate differ-
entials based on sex . . . is a joint responsibility held by the
union or unions with the employer. 2
Sagner is valuable precedent for ADEA plaintiffs seeking
damages from unions.73 While in that case the court based union
" See, for example, EEOC v Ferris State College, 493 F Supp 707 (W D Mich 1980);
Murphy v Miller Brewing Co., 307 F Supp 829 (E D Wis 1969).
69 462 F2d 180 (4th Cir 1972) (affirming Hodgson v Sagner, Inc., 326 F Supp 371 (D Md
1971)).
70 326 F Supp at 376-77.
71 Id at 373-74.
72 Opinion Letter No 1187 of the Wage and Hour Administration (July 1, 1971), quot-
ing 29 USC § 206(d)(2)), cited in Brennan v Emerald Renovators, Inc., 410 F Supp 1057,
1060 n 6 (S D NY 1975). The Department does not always act consistently with these regu-
lations. In Sagner, the Secretary of Labor asked the court to find the union jointly liable for
damages, but one year later in Hodgson v School Board, 56 FRD 393 (W D Pa 1972), the
government objected (unsuccessfully) to joinder of a union as a co-defendant on the grounds
that the union would not be punished if found liable.
13 The language of the opinion is broad, but the case could be narrowly construed to
apply only to particularly egregious union conduct. If limited to its facts, Sagner may be
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liability on equitable principles invoked sua sponte, the ADEA ex-
pressly permits the use of equitable principles in fashioning relief
for statutory violations. 4 Thus, a court could point both to Sagner
and to the ADEA's broad remedial language to support granting
monetary relief against a union.
Moreover, as the exclusive statutory remedy for age discrimi-
nation, the ADEA presents an even stronger case for liberal con-
struction than the EPA provisions interpreted in Sagner. The
EPA's prohibition on sex discrimination is independently rein-
forced by Title VII, which explicitly provides for assessing backpay
against unions.7 5 Thus, a plaintiff who is unsuccessful in recovering
from a union under the EPA may turn to Title VII for relief. The
ADEA, by contrast, is the exclusive statutory remedy for age dis-
crimination,7 6 and the case for liberal construction of remedial pro-
visions is compelling when injured plaintiffs possess no alternative
statutory routes to recovery.
III. FEDERAL LABOR LAW: THE UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION
Twenty years before Congress began enacting employment
discrimination statutes, the Supreme Court recognized that unions
might abuse their position as the sole representative of employees.
In 1944, in Steele v Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,77 the
Court fashioned the duty of fair representation as a means of hold-
ing unions accountable for discriminatory practices. If an employee
could prove that she was injured by her union's breach of this
duty, she was entitled to monetary relief from the union.
The duty of fair representation and the ADEA serve a com-
mon goal-the protection of employee rights. Currently, however,
unions that discriminate on the basis of age are held financially
responsible for their actions only under the duty of fair representa-
tion. This incongruity is disturbing. It not only reduces the protec-
tion available to employees, but also forces age discrimination
valid precedent for ADEA plaintiffs only when the union has acted in extreme bad faith.
74 29 USC § 626(b).
75 42 USC § 2000e-5(g).
76 The following cases involve unsuccessful attempts by plaintiffs to bring age discrimi-
nation claims under Title VII or 42 USC § 1983 (1982): Ring v Crisp County Hospital Au-
thority, 652 F Supp 477 (M D Ga 1987) (§ 1983 claim); McCroan v Bailey, 543 F Supp 1201
(S D Ga 1982) (§ 1983 claim); Frye v Grandy, 625 F Supp 1573 (D Md 1986) (§ 1983 and
Title VII claims); Morgan v Humboldt County School District, 623 F Supp 440 (D Nev
1985) (§ 1983 and Title VII claims).
77 323 US 192 (1944).
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plaintiffs to fit their suits into the procedural and substantive
framework of the duty of fair representation. This and the follow-
ing section explore the ramifications of the disparity between
union liability under the two areas of law.
A. The Standard for Union Conduct Under the Duty of Fair
Representation
When first articulating the duty of fair representation in
Steele,'7 8 the Supreme Court found the duty implicit in the provi-
sions of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") 79 :
Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to
represent non-union members of the craft, at least to the ex-
tent of not discriminating against them as such in the con-
tracts which it makes as their representative, the minority
would be left with no means of protecting their interests or,
indeed, their right to earn a livelihood .... The fair interpre-
tation of the statutory language is that the organization cho-
sen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the
majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not
against those whom it represents.8 0
In Steele and other early decisions developing the duty of fair
representation doctrine,"' the Court was disturbed by the unions'
apparently racial motives for acting against black workers in col-
lective bargaining groups. These cases illustrate that discrimina-
tory conduct by unions spurred the Court's development of the
duty of fair representation.
The Court developed the doctrine further in Ford Motor Com-
pany v Huffman, 2 and for the first time applied it outside the area
of race discrimination. In-Huffman, the Court stated that the bar-
gaining representative "owes complete loyalty to. . .the interests
78 Id.
" 45 USC §§ 151-188 (1982). In Wallace Corp. v Labor Board, 323 US 248 (1944), a
case decided the same day as Steele, the Court suggested that the same duty of fair repre-
sentation could be based on § 9(a) of the NLRA. The Court officially recognized that the
NLRA imposed this duty in Ford Motor Corp. v Huffman, 345 US 330 (1953).
80 323 US at 201-02. In Steele, the Court compared the union's duty in negotiating a
collective bargaining agreement to that of a legislature in the act of governance, holding that
the union must fairly represent all its constituents.
81 See Tunstall v Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 US 210, 213 (1944) (union
alleged to have stripped black plaintiff of seniority rights because of race).
82 345 US 330 (1953) (Court found valid a seniority provision in a collective bargaining
agreement that gave some seniority credit for pre- and post-employment military service).
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of all whom it represents. 8 3 The Court qualified this expansive
language, however, by giving the union wide discretion, subject
only to "complete good faith and honesty of purpose." '
The Court expanded the fair representation doctrine further
in Conley v Gibson.8 5 In Conley, the union had refused to help
wrongfully discharged black employees prepare their grievances.
The Court held that the union's duty to fairly represent employees
applies through all phases of the labor relationship s' and that, con-
sequently, the union is obliged not only to negotiate but also to
administer a collective agreement fairly and without
discrimination.
The Court finally enunciated a complete standard for the duty
of fair representation in Vaca v Sipes.8 1 The union in Vaca termi-
nated an employee's grievance before entering final arbitration.
The employee charged the union with arbitrary action, but the
Court disagreed, finding that the union acted reasonably in settling
the grievance before proceeding to time consuming arbitration. 8 In
holding for the union, however, the Court bolstered the position of
subsequent plaintiffs by broadening the duty of fair representation
to preclude not only discriminatory or bad faith actions, but arbi-
trary conduct as well. 9
Since Vaca, the Supreme Court has vacillated on the duty of
fair representation standard. It narrowed the Vaca standard some-
what in Motor Coach Employees v Lockridge9 to proscribe only
intentional and severe union conduct.9 1 However, in Hines v
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 2 the most recent case addressing the
93 Id at 338.
8, The Court noted: "A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bar-
gaining representative ... ." Id.
85 355 US 41 (1957).
86 Id at 46.
87 386 US 171 (1967).
" Id at 192-93.
88 See id at 190. The court noted elsewhere: "[T]he duty of fair representation has
stood as the bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of
traditional forms of redress by provisions of the federal labor law." Id at 182.
90 403 US 274 (1971).
91 The plaintiff in Lockridge brought an action for damages against the union for its
role in the employee's wrongful discharge pursuant to a union security clause. Building on
the "bad faith" prong of the Vaca standard, the Court stated that the plaintiff must present
"substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct." Id at 299 (quoting
Humphrey v Moore, 375 US 335, 348 (1964)). The Court then refused to find the labor
officials' misrepresentation of the union contract a breach of the duty of fair representation,
although such behavior was arguably "arbitrary" under Vaca.
92 424 US 554 (1976).
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duty of fair representation standard, the Supreme Court disre-
garded the restrictive language of Lockridge and returned to
Vaca's emphasis on arbitrary union conduct.93 The case also illus-
trates a shift from using the duty of fair representation to facilitate
collective bargaining to using it to protect individual workers'
rights against union abridgement.
Although the Vaca "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith"
standard remains the law, the continual shifts in Supreme Court
doctrine concerning the type of conduct that constitutes a breach
of the union's statutory duty have left the lower courts with little
guidance. 4 Certain standards are clear, however. Courts hold un-
ions to a less rigorous standard of conduct in negotiating a collec-
tive bargaining agreement than in administering the agreement.15
Courts justify this lower standard by noting that unions must be
able to compromise in order to establish an agreement with the
employer.9" Such a compromise may involve subordinating the
rights of individuals within the bargaining unit to achieve the max-
imum possible benefit for the unit as a whole.
The standard governing union conduct in the administration
of a collective agreement is more stringent.97 Vaca allows the union
" In Hines the plaintiff-employees brought an action against the union, charging that
it had breached its duty of fair representation in failing adequately to investigate the em-
ployer's charges against them. The Supreme Court upheld the claim, stating:
"[E]nforcement of the finality provision where the arbitrator has erred is conditioned upon
the union's having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the employee in connection
with the arbitration proceedings." 424 US at 571. Hines may provide a basis for formulating
the duty of fair representation in negligence terms-a subject that has generated much
scholarly commentary. See David L. Gregory, Union Liability for Damages after Bowen v
Postal Service: The Incongruity Between Labor Law and Title VII Jurisprudence, 35 Bay-
lor L Rev 237, 255 n 102 (1983) (citing numerous articles on the subject).
" In Ruzicka v General Motors Corp., 649 F2d 1207 (6th Cir 1981), a Sixth Circuit
panel interpreted the "bad faith" prong of Vaca to require a finding of intentional miscon-
duct. Other courts have used the apparent elasticity of the term "arbitrary" to hold unions
liable for varying degrees of negligence. See, for example, Robesky v Qantas Empire Air-
ways Ltd., 573 F2d 1082, 1086-88 (9th Cir 1978); de Arroyo v Sindicato De Trabajadores
Packing, AFL-CIO, 425 F2d 281, 284 (1st Cir 1970); Baldini v Local U. No. 1095, 581 F2d
145, 151 (7th Cir 1978).
'8 Clyde W. Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agree-
ment: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U Pa L Rev 251, 254-57 (1977).
" Huffman, 345 US at 338 ("A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statu-
tory bargaining representative.. . ."). An example of a court allowing a union to exercise
wide discretion during negotiation is Bartman v Allis-Chalmers Corp., 799 F2d 311, 316
(7th Cir 1986).
17 See Foust v IBEW, 572 F2d 710 (10th Cir 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 US 42
(1979) (court found breach of duty when union negligently failed to file an employee's griev-
ance in a timely manner); Robesky, 573 F2d 1082 (union's reckless failure to notify an em-
ployee that her grievance would not be taken to arbitration was breach of duty); de Arroyo,
425 F2d 281 (union's failure to investigate grievance was a breach despite allegations of good
1102 [56:1087
Union Liability Under ADEA
to terminate individual grievances only if such decisions are made
in good faith and without discriminatory intent. Hines further lim-
its the discretion of unions by prohibiting gross errors of judgment
in the processing of individual employees' grievances.
Supreme Court doctrine in this area, as outlined above, re-
flects a fundamental tension between two competing concerns: the
need to protect the individual worker against discrimination by her
union and the desire to facilitate collective bargaining between un-
ions and employers for the good of employees as a group. This ten-
sion may have had an effect on lower courts applying the fair rep-
resentation doctrine. Courts discuss the importance of protecting
the individual employee, but the outcomes of cases reflect judicial
deference to union decisions that adversely affect isolated work-
ers."8 This deference places a heavy burden on employee-plaintiffs
in duty of fair representation actions and decreases the likelihood
of recovery.9 The significance of this heavy plaintiff's burden for
interpretation of the age discrimination statute will be discussed in
a later section of this comment.100
B. Union Liability for Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation
Wallace Corp v Labor Board0 1 and Ford Motor Company v
Huffman '02 established the right of the individual worker to bring
suit against her union for breach of the duty of fair representation
under § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.10 3 The worker
can sue her employer under § 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act 04 if the employer discriminated against her and
breached the collective bargaining agreement.10 5
faith). See generally Julia Penny Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical
Structure, 51 Tex L Rev 1119 (1973); Paul H. Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Dis-
charged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U Cin L Rev 55 (1972).
" Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in Fact,
34 Buff L Rev 89 (1985).
"1 Id. See also Comment, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation-Fact or Fiction,
60 Marq L Rev 1116, 1116-17; Comment, Section 301 Employee Remedies and the Duty of
Fair Representation: The Growing Need to Protect Individual Employee Rights, 11 South-
ern U L Rev 87, 96 (1985); Paul H. Tobias, The Plaintiff's View of "301-DFR" Litigation, 5
Emp Rel L J 510, 521 (1979-80).
100 See notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
101 323 US 248 (1944).
20 345 US 330 (1953).
103 29 USC § 159(a).
1 29 USC §§ 141-69, 171-97 (1982).
105 Smith v Evening News, 371 US 195 (1962) (holding that an individual employee
could bring suit against an employer under § 301, toppling the dominant view that only
unions could bring suit under the statute).
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In Humphrey v Moore,10 6 the Supreme Court endorsed the
view that an employee could simultaneously bring an action
against the employer for breach of contract and against the union
for breach of its duty of fair representation under § 301 of the
LMRA. However, the plaintiff-employee would have to prove a
breach by the union of its duty of fair representation before col-
lecting from the employer for breach of contract.10 7 In the early
duty of fair representation cases, the employee sought damages
from the union. In Conley v Gibson,08 for example, the employees
alleged wrongful conduct by the union and the employer, but
sought damages only from the union. The Court held the union
responsible for its own actions, and treated employer liability as an
independent issue.109 The opinion did not address the issue of ap-
portionment of damages between the employer and the union
when their joint actions discriminated against individual
employees.
After Conley, the lower courts generally held unions and the
employers jointly and severally liable for discriminatory negotia-
tion and administration of collective agreements. 0 In Vaca, the
Supreme Court held that liability for damages should be appor-
tioned in relation to the respective fault of the parties:
The governing principle ... is to apportion liability between
the employer and the union according to the damage caused
by the fault of each. Thus, damages attributable solely to the
employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the
union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the
union's refusal to process the grievance should not be charged
to the employer."'
In the end, this principle means that the bulk of damages (usually
backpay) is paid by the employer who has triggered the lawsuit by
106 375 US 335 (1964).
107 In his Humphrey concurrence, Justice Goldberg clarified the source of a duty of fair
representation/§ 301 suit, explaining that a suit against a union is not based on § 301 of the
LMRA but on § 9(a) of the NLRA. Section 301 does not provide jurisdiction for indepen-
dent fair representation suits, but it does allow a court to hear a fair representation claim
annexed to a breach of contract action brought against an employer. 375 US at 351.
108 355 US 41 (1957).
109 Id at 45.
110 See, for example, Richardson v Texas And New Orleans Railroad Co., 242 F2d 230,
236 (5th Cir 1957); Hiller v Liquor Salesmen's Union Local No. 2, 338 F2d 778, 779 (2d Cir
1964); Cunningham v Erie Railroad Co., 243 F Supp 571, 576 (S D NY 1965), aft'd, 358 F2d
640 (2d Cir 1966).
11 386 US at 197-98.
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wrongfully discharging the employee. The Vaca Court emphasized
that the union's conduct and the discharge by the employer were
separate actions; the union had not colluded with the employer to
discriminate against the employee or caused the employer to
wrongfully discharge him. The Court suggested that if the union
had done so, joint and several liability would have been proper."'
Two criticisms have been made of the Vaca apportionment
approach. Some commentators have noted that the Vaca standard
is based on a narrow view of causation." 3 By emphasizing the dis-
charge, the standard ignores the dynamics of the collective bar-
gaining process. Discharge is only the first step in an employee's
permanent termination, and a union's action after discharge can
significantly affect whether an employee remains terminated.
Thus, a union can often be a greater cause of termination than the
Court recognized."' Second, the Vaca standard, as construed by
the Court in a later case," 5 does little to deter egregious union con-
duct."' Malicious unions are not punished to any greater extent
than negligent ones.
The Vaca causation principle in particular has proved difficult
for the lower federal courts to apply.17 When the Supreme Court
encountered the apportionment issue in Hines v Anchor Motor
Freight,"5 the majority opinion glossed over it, but a concurrence
by Justice Stewart provided some much needed guidance." 9 Jus-
11 Id at 197 n 18.
11 See, for example, Comment, Apportionment of Damages in DFR/Contract Suits:
Who Pays for the Union's Breach, 1981 Wis L Rev 155, 175-76.
114 See id. The Court modified the Vaca apportionment principle in Czosek v O'Mara,
397 US 25, 29 (1970), where in dictum it stated that the employer would be solely liable for
lost backpay if it acted independently of the union in discharging the worker. The Court
reasoned that the employer is the contractual obligor and the union's only duty is statutory.
The union's breach of its duty required the employees to hire outside counsel to bring an
action against the employer. Therefore, the union should be liable for employees' attorneys'
fees and court costs only, not for contractual damages such as backpay. Critics of the Czosek
standard note that it does not deter egregious union conduct. Comment, A Proposal for
Apportioning Damages in Fair Representation Suits, 14 U Mich J L Ref 497, 509-12
(1981); Comment, 1981 Wis L Rev at 177-79 (cited in note 113).
"1 Czosek, 397 US 25 (union that had discriminatorily refused to process employee's
grievance held liable for attorney's fees and court costs only; employer, as contractual obli-
gor, is liable in full for backpay).
11 Comment, 14 U Mich J L Ref at 509-12 (cited in note 114); Comment, 1981 Wis L
Rev at 177-79 (cited in note 113).
117 Compare de Arroyo, 425 F2d at 281 (court holds employer solely liable for backpay
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the union participated in the wrongful discharge),
with Ruzicka v General Motors Corp., 523 F2d 306 (6th Cir 1975), vacated and remanded,
649 F2d 1207 (damages split evenly between union and employer).
is 424 US 554 (1976).
n" 424 US at 572-73 (Stewart concurring).
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tice Stewart used a chronological causation analysis, explaining
that the employer is liable for all damages caused by its breach of
contract up to the point that the employee would have been rein-
stated but for the union's breach of its statutory duty. The union
is liable for the employee's lost wages dating from its breach. Jus-
tice Stewart's approach provides increased deterrence for union
misconduct, although critics believe it ignores the realities of fair
representation litigation. 120 Since a union breach typically occurs a
short time after discharge, the union will generally be responsible
for the bulk of the damages. For a union that acted only negli-
gently, Stewart's methodology may amount to punitive damages.
The Supreme Court's most recent word on apportionment of
liability in a duty of fair representation/§ 301 suit came in Bowen v
United States Postal Service. 2' In Bowen, the Court embraced
the causation analysis set forth in Justice Stewart's Hines concur-
rence and held the union liable for the increase in damages caused
by its failure to responsibly represent the employee. The employer
remained secondarily liable for the damages attributed to the
union. The Court emphasized that the primary concern in a duty
of fair representation/§ 301 suit should be full compensation of the
injured employee. 2 2 The Bowen opinion illustrates that the Court
is willing to impose substantial monetary liability on unions guilty
of discriminatory conduct under the fair representation doctrine.
The Supreme Court's suggestion in Vaca that federal courts
fashion appropriate remedies for breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation 23 has led to a variety of remedial awards. The principal
award in these actions is compensation for lost wages, although
courts also regularly award attorney's fees and court costs as well
as injunctive relief. 2 4 When reinstatement is not feasible, the
courts occasionally award prospective relief for lost future earn-
ings. 25 Finally, while some plaintiffs have been compensated for
120 See Comment, 14 U Mich J L Ref 497 (cited in nte 114); Bowen v United States
Postal Service, 459 US 212, 239 (1983) (White dissenting).
121 459 US 212.
122 Id at 223 n 12.
121 Vaca, 386 US at 197 n 18.
124 See Soto Segarra v Sea-Land Service, Inc., 581 F2d 291, 298 (1st Cir 1978) (award-
ing employee-plaintiff backpay and attorney's fees); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v
Jones, 229 F2d 648 (5th Cir 1956) (awarding backpay and injunctive relief); Milstead v
International Bro. of Teamsters, 580 F2d 232, 237 (6th Cir 1978) (authorizing award of
attorney's fees); Bowen v United States Postal Service, 470 F Supp 1127, 1132 (W D Va
1979) (authorizing award of court costs). See Comment, Breaching the Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation: The Union's Liability, 17 John Marshall L Rev 415, 424 n 42-47 (1984).
2I See Bowen, 470 F Supp at 1131.
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mental distress, such awards are not common."'
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v
Foust,27 the Supreme Court held that punitive damages are never
appropriate in duty of fair representation suits, expressing concern
that large jury verdicts could bankrupt unions. This limitation,
however, decreases the courts' ability to fashion remedies that will
provide maximum deterrence for egregious union conduct.
In sum, federal labor law holds unions fully responsible for
their discriminatory conduct. In a duty of fair representation ac-
tion, unions are generally held liable for discrimination against em-
ployees in a bargaining unit. If a union has participated in the ne-
gotiation of a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement, the
courts will hold the union jointly and severally liable for all dam-
ages. In addition, if a union has failed faithfully to administer a
labor agreement, the courts will impose liability from the time the
union's breach "causes" continuing employee damages. Once the
union is found liable, it must pay damages, generally in the form of
backpay.
The evolution of the fair representation doctrine illustrates
the Court's recognition that discriminatory actions by unions can
seriously affect a worker's ability to make a living. Thus, the Court
is concerned both with fully compensating victims of discrimina-
tion and with deterring union misconduct.
C. The Relationship Between the Duty of Fair Representation
and the ADEA
The doctrine of the duty of fair representation and the ADEA
are related in that they proscribe the same types of union behav-
ior. This relation is not coincidental: the substantive provisions of
the ADEA were modeled on those of Title VII, which were
modeled on the NLRA, the statutory basis for the duty of fair rep-
resentation.1 28 Thus, behavior violative of the ADEA often may
"' See Farmer v ARA Services, Inc., 660 F2d 1096, 1107 (6th Cir 1981) and de Arroyo,
425 F2d at 293 (both awarding damages for pain and suffering/mental damages). But see
Soto Segarra, 581 F2d at 297-98 (damages for mental suffering can only be awarded in
egregious cases; federal labor policy does not favor extreme damage awards).
" 442 US 42 (1979).
'28 Franks v Bowman Transport Co., Inc., 424 US 747, 769 (1976) (NLRA forbids em-
ployers to differentiate among classes of employees without justification). See also US
EEOC v County of Calumet, 686 F2d 1249 (7th Cir 1982) (ADEA subordinates the principle
of majority rule in the bargaining unit to the individual's right to be free from age discrimi-
nation; ADEA can be read to require the implicit insertion of a "no age discrimination"
clause in labor contracts).
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also violate the duty of fair representation, and the two avenues
stand as concurrent remedies for aggrieved plaintiffs. The Supreme
Court has said that injured employees may simultaneously pursue
all available avenues of relief for discriminatory conduct." 9 How-
ever, they can be fully compensated only once for any single dis-
criminatory act.130
Federal courts construing the ADEA have recognized the rela-
tionship between the fair representation doctrine and the ADEA.
In Bartman v Allis-Chalmers Corp.,'3' the plaintiffs alleged that
the union and employer had violated the ADEA by "forcing" em-
ployees to retire under threat of reduced benefits if they chose to
remain employed. The court first analyzed the claim under the
ADEA and then noted that the conduct pleaded in the complaint
could constitute a breach of the union's duty of fair representation
as well. The court proceeded to analyze the claim under the fair
representation doctrine, although the plaintiffs had not explicitly
alleged a violation of the duty of fair representation.3 2
This close relationship between the duty of fair representation
and the ADEA suggests that union conduct which violates both
should be similarly treated under the two doctrines. Similar treat-
ment would produce a desirable synergy between federal labor law
and the federal age discrimination statute, since the two areas of
jurisprudence share comparable goals.
In each of the cases referred to in the introductory section of
this comment, 33 the plaintiffs claimed that the union had discrim-
inated against them in violation of the ADEA. The alleged behav-
ior of the union in each case would also constitute a breach of the
duty of fair representation, although none of the plaintiffs included
this claim in their complaints. In ALPA v TWA, the court found
that the employer and the union violated the ADEA by modifying
the labor agreement to include an age-based promotion policy that
discriminated against pilots nearing retirement age. Similarly, in
EEOC v ALPA, the Court held that the union and the employer
violated the ADEA by agreeing to a contractual provision that gave
60 year-old pilots less favorable vacation benefits than younger pi-
lots. The plaintiffs in Neuman v Northwest Airlines, Inc. claimed
that the union and the carrier negotiated and signed a contract
219 Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co., 415 US 36 (1974).
130 See Bowe v Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F2d 711, 715 (7th Cir 1969).
131 799 F2d 311 (7th Cir 1986).
132 Id at 315.
133 See notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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requiring the retirement of flight deck crew members at age 60 in
violation of the ADEA.
In each of these cases, the union's behavior, if proven, would
constitute a breach of its duty to fairly represent the employees in
its bargaining units. Although the Supreme Court has stated that
the union can exercise wide discretion in negotiating a labor con-
tract, this discretion is constrained by the requirements of good
faith and a lack of discriminatory motive.1 4 Union conduct violat-
ing the ADEA would not be free of discriminatory motivation and
would therefore also constitute a breach of the duty of fair
representation.
Had these cases been brought under the fair representation
doctrine, the unions would have been liable for at least half of the
plaintiff's backpay in each.135 In two of the cases, however, the
courts refused to impose liability on the unions because the actions
were brought under the ADEA rather than the duty of fair repre-
sentation.136  In short, it was the label put on the employee's
claim-not the union's culpability-that determined the union's fi-
nancial liability.137
Troubling consequences result from the courts' inconsistent
treatment of union discrimination under the ADEA and the fair
representation doctrine. First, the incongruity encourages employ-
ees to circumvent the ADEA enforcement regime, which was spe-
cifically designed to encourage conciliation and informal proceed-
ings in resolving age discrimination problems. 3 '
Because courts have been more inclined to award damages
against unions in suits brought under the duty of fair representa-
tion, employees suffering from union conduct actionable under ei-
"" Huffman, 345 US at 330. Lower federal courts have held that unions cannot bargain
away employees' rights to bring age discrimination claims. See County of Calumet, 686 F2d
at 1249.
135 See text accompanying notes 120-22.
I'l See ALPA v TWA, 713 F2d at 940; Neuman, 28 FEP Cases (BNA) at 1488.
,37 In Bolero v Cuyahoga County Public Library Union, 1988 US Dist LEXIS 9266 (N
D Ohio), the plaintiff-employee did not claim that the union had negotiated a discrimina-
tory contract, but rather that the union refused to take her grievance to arbitration because
of her age and national origin. The court held that these actions, if proven, would violate the
ADEA and would support holding the union financially responsible. The union's conduct
would also violate the duty of fair representation because federal labor law holds the union
to a stringent standard in processing the grievances of injured employees. See Hines, 424 US
at 554. When a union contributes to the damage of a wrongfully discharged employee by
maliciously refusing to process the employee's grievance, Bowen requires the union to com-
pensate the employee for the wages lost subsequent to the breach. See Bowen, 459 US at
212.
.. See text at note 14.
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ther doctrine are encouraged to bypass the ADEA and bring a duty
of fair representation action, thereby increasing their chances of
gaining monetary relief from the union. A plaintiff in a duty of fair
representation action, however, is not required to notify the EEOC
before proceeding.139 Thus, in their narrow reading of union liabil-
ity under the ADEA, courts frustrate the conciliatory processes
deemed important to addressing age discrimination at the time of
the passage of the ADEA. The second unfortunate consequence of
the inconsistent application of the duty of fair representation and
the ADEA is a possible decrease in the deterrence of age
discrimination.
A potential plaintiff has two choices. She can bring an action
under the ADEA and risk the court's refusal to assess monetary
damages against the union. Alternatively, she can bring a duty of
fair representation action and risk dismissal for failure to satisfy
the heavy evidentiary burden placed on plaintiffs in such actions.
Despite the stringent standards imposed on union conduct
under the duty of fair representation, courts tend to favor union
defendants in fair representation suits in order to facilitate collec-
tive bargaining.14 0 As one commentator has noted, "[P]laintiffs still
face a lonely, uphill, and losing battle in court .... [T]he ultimate
outcome [of duty of fair representation suits] is generally defeat
for the employees. 14 1 Under either alternative, the union's age dis-
crimination goes undeterred, and the injured plaintiff remains un-
compensated. These results are incompatible with the purposes of
the ADEA.
Victims of age discrimination should be encouraged to bring
private actions under the ADEA in order to deter discriminatory
conduct. Although Congress emphasized the desirability of concili-
atory efforts by the Secretary of Labor to eliminate age discrimina-
tion, it also recognized the necessity of private enforcement and
"' The employee may, however, be required to exhaust union grievance procedures
before bringing the duty of fair representation suit. Glover v St. Louis-San Francisco Rail-
way Co., 393 US 324, 329 (1969); Republic Steel Corp. v Maddox, 379 US 650, 652 (1965).
Courts generally make exceptions to this threshold requirement when the plaintiff shows
that the union procedures would be ineffective. Clayton v International Union, United
Auto Workers, 451 US 679, 685 (1981); Glover, 393 US at 331; Vaca, 386 US at 185. Courts
will also allow a plaintiff alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation during the
negotiation stage of the collective agreement to bring the action without exhausting internal
procedures. See Steele, 323 US at 206; Farmer, 660 F2d at 1106.
24 See Goldberg, 34 Buff L Rev 89 (cited in note 98) (a study of duty of fair represen-
tation actions demonstrating that plaintiffs win in less than 5 per cent of the cases filed).
141 Tobias, 5 Empl Rel L J at 523 (cited in note 99).
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explicitly provided for it in the ADEA. 42 Section 7 of the ADEA
requires only that the injured employee notify the Secretary before
initiating a lawsuit,143 not that she go through an agency proceed-
ing instead of a court action.
The experience of the Department of Labor in the years fol-
lowing passage of the ADEA demonstrates that private lawsuits
are necessary to ensure deterrence of age discrimination. Statistics
compiled by the Department indicate that the vast majority of age
discrimination cases are not resolved by conciliation. 44 The Secre-
tary (and now, the EEOC) makes only a limited number of concili-
ation attempts, and an even smaller number of cases are success-
fully settled by the agency. Thus, Congressional belief in the
necessity of private enforcement of the ADEA was well-founded,
and courts should enact Congress's prescience by ensuring that
successful plaintiffs receive full compensation from all parties
guilty of age discrimination. Absent such a purposive interpreta-
tion, the ADEA will not be fully effective in decreasing age
discrimination.
IV. FINDING A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST UNIONS UNDER THE
ADEA
No court that has faced the issue of union liability for dam-
ages under the ADEA has given the question the careful considera-
tion it deserves. Courts denying union liability have rigidly inter-
preted the "amounts owing" provision in § 7(b) of the ADEA145 to
require full incorporation of § 16(b) of the FLSA, which limits lia-
bility to employers. This construction of the Act ignores the selec-
tive incorporation notion advanced by Congress. It also ignores the
difference in the purposes of the two statutes and, as a result, hin-
ders the effectuation of the ADEA's objectives.
Courts imposing monetary liability on unions have cited the
broad remedial provision in § 7(b) as the basis for their decision.146
This interpretation of § 7 is a defensible reading of the text, but it
12 29 USC § 626(b).
143 29 USC § 626(d).
144 Department of Labor, Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A Report
Covering Activities Under the Act During 1976 (1977), cited in Vazquez v Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 579 F2d 107, 111 (1st Cir 1978). This study shows that only 32 per cent of the cases
pursued by the agency were resolved through conciliation. However, the majority of cases
were not pursued by the agency, so the percentage of total cases resolved by conciliation is
actually much lower than 32 percent.
14 See text at note 18.
146 See text accompanying note 24.
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leaves the courts open-ended discretion to fashion limitless reme-
dies under the Act. Neither approach produces an analytical
framework that adheres to the text, comports with the legislative
history, and furthers the purposes of the statute. This section at-
tempts to formulate such an approach.
A. Selective Incorporation of FLSA Remedies
The "amounts owing" provision in § 7(b) of the ADEA need
not be read to require wholesale incorporation of § 16(b) of the
FLSA. Instead, the provision can be construed to require the selec-
tive incorporation of the FLSA's limited remedies into the ADEA.
The remedies specified in the FLSA-"unpaid minimum wages
and unpaid overtime compensation"- only compensate the plain-
tiff for economic losses. The FLSA does not allow other compensa-
tory damages, such as relief for pain and suffering. Thus, the
ADEA's selective incorporation of the FLSA remedies can be inter-
preted to limit ADEA remedies to compensation for economic loss.
The broad remedial provision in § 7(b) of the ADEA autho-
rizes courts to grant such "legal or equitable relief as necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the Act. ' 1 7 However, this broad grant of
power must be understood as circumscribed by the limitation on
the type of damages available.14 s With this limitation on the dis-
cretion of the courts to fashion relief under the Act, the broad re-
medial language in § 7(b) can be read to authorize the assessment
of damages against unions. The provision is no longer open-ended.
Courts are limited to compensating plaintiffs for economic losses
only, but they can require any party whose conduct is proscribed
by the substantive provisions of the Act to pay for the pecuniary
injuries they cause. This construction of the ADEA allows courts to
effectuate its objectives while remaining faithful to the limitations
it imposes on judicial remedial power.
Other provisions of §7(b) of the ADEA can be read consistent
with this interpretation of the ADEA. For instance, the section
also states: "The provisions of this Act shall be enforced in accor-
dance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sec-
tions 11(b), 16,... and 17 of the [FLSA] ... and subsection (c) of
147 29 USC § 626(b).
148 Koyen v Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 560 F Supp 1161, 1168 (S D NY
1983) ("The manifest purpose of this broad grant of legal and equitable power is to enable
the courts to fashion whatever remedy is required to fully compensate an employee for the
economic injury sustained by him.").
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this section." '149 These sections of the FLSA describe the adminis-
trative procedures available to the Secretary and the private liti-
gant in enforcing the statute.15° Section 7(b)'s requirement that the
ADEA be administered in accordance with these sections of the
FLSA means only that the Secretary and the private plaintiff must
follow the FLSA procedures; it does not mandate the application
of the FLSA substantive restrictions on union liability to non-
FLSA claims.151
A textual reading that emphasizes the procedural rather than
substantive correlation between the FLSA and the ADEA is con-
sistent with statements of Congressional intent.152 It takes the no-
tion of "selective incorporation" seriously, freeing the ADEA from
provisions of the FLSA that are incompatible with the context and
objectives of the age discrimination statute. The following sections
discuss several reasons why this construction of the ADEA is pref-
erable to the interpretations articulated by the courts.
B. Support for Selective Incorporation: ADEA Case Law
Courts construing the ADEA have limited its remedial provi-
sions to cover only economic loss. For example, every circuit that
has addressed the availability of compensatory damages under the
ADEA has refused to award damages for pain and suffering. 5 '
This refusal makes sense for several reasons. First, as noted by
the First Circuit in Vazquez v Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,5 the reme-
dial provisions of the FLSA do not authorize compensatory dam-
149 29 USC § 626(b).
150 Section 11(b) of the FLSA authorizes the Secretary to use state and local agencies to
administer the Act. 29 USC § 211(b). In addition to authorizing private actions, § 16(c)
describes the general power of the Secretary to bring actions to recover unpaid wages and to
supervise the disbursement of the recovered wages to affected employees. 29 USC § 216(c).
Section 17 gives district courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions restraining violations of the
statute. 29 USC § 217.
151 See Sagner, 326 F Supp at 371 (while construing the FLSA remedial provision in an
EPA action, the court assessed damages against a union on the basis of its "equitable" pow-
ers to fashion effective remedies).
15, See text at notes 39-43. See also Hearings on S 830 and S 788 before the Subcom-
mittee on Labor at 24-25 (cited in note 23) (remarks of Sen Javits); id at 29 (remarks of Sen
Smathers) (emphasizing Congress's desire to use an existing bureaucracy to administer the
ADEA because industry and the agency were familiar with the procedures). Also compare
29 USC § 623(c) (substantive provision of ADEA) with 42 USC § 2000e-2(c) (substantive
provision of Title VII applicable to labor organizations).
15S Johnson v Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F2d 143, 146-48 (2d Cir 1984); Per-
rell v Financeamerica Corp., 726 F2d 654, 657 (10th Cir 1984); Fiedler v Indianhead Truck
Line, Inc., 670 F2d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir 1982); Vazquez v Eastern Airlines, Inc., 579 F2d
107, 111-12 (1st Cir 1978).
' 579 F2d 107.
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ages for pain and suffering. In addition, the legislative history of
the ADEA suggests that Congress intended to authorize compensa-
tion only for economic losses.155 Although Congress recognized the
detrimental effect that age discrimination has on the mental health
of its victims, it included no express remedy for pain and suffer-
ing.156 A final argument that courts have used in denying non-eco-
nomic compensatory damages under the ADEA is that such awards
might decrease the likelihood of conciliation, an important purpose
of the Act. If an ADEA plaintiff is aware that a large award for
pain and suffering may be available from the courts, she will be
more likely to litigate than to go through the agency.1
57
The weight of authority holds that an ADEA plaintiff can re-
cover "front pay" damages for future lost earnings when she has
been the victim of discrimination and reinstatement is not feasi-
ble. 58 The availability of such damages is also consistent with the
ADEA's selective incorporation of FLSA remedies. First, a future
damage award is compensation for an economic loss and thus au-
thorized by the remedial provisions of the FLSA. Second, without
the availability of front pay, employers could avoid the objectives
of the ADEA by making reinstatement so unattractive that plain-
115 Congress has stated that "[Under the ADEA] 'amounts owing' contemplates two
elements: First, it includes items of pecuniary or economic loss such as wages, fringe, and
other job-related benefits. Second, it includes liquidated damages (calculated as an amount
equal to the pecuniary loss)." HR Rep No 95-950, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 13 (1978).
158 See Age Discrimination in Employment Hearings on HR 3651, HR 3768, and HR
4221 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
90th Cong, 1st Sess at 403-04 (Aug 16, 1967) (statement of Charles Rowan, Fraternal Order
of Eagles); id at 421-22 (statement of Rep Pepper). See also Department of Labor, The
Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment at 100-02. The text of the Act
authorizes an award for lost wages and for an equal amount in liquidated damages in cases
of willful violations of the statute. See note 22 for the rationale behind the liquidated dam-
ages provision. See also Stevenson v J.C. Penney Co., 464 F Supp 945, 948-49 (N D Ill
1979); Rogers v Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 530 F2d 834, 840 (3d Cir 1977) (con-
struing the ADEA in accordance with its history and refusing to compensate plaintiffs for
pain and suffering).
157 See Rogers, 530 F2d at 841. But see Vazquez, 579 F2d at 111 (rejedting Rogers anal-
ysis because employer has less reason to conciliate if he knows the damages available to a
successful plaintiff in litigation are limited to purely economic losses).
'" Wildman v Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F2d 605, 614-16 (1st Cir 1985); Whittlesey v
Union Carbide Corp., 742 F2d 724, 726 (2d Cir 1984); Maxfield v Sinclair International,
766 F2d 788, 795-97 (3d Cir 1985); Smith v Office of Personnel Management, 778 F2d 258,
262 n 2 (5th Cir 1985) (dictum); Davis v Combustion Engineering, Inc., 742 F2d 916, 922-23
(6th Cir 1984); Gibson v Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir 1982); Cancellier
v Federated Department Stores, 672 F2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir 1982); EEOC v Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan Association, 741 F2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir 1984); O'Donnell v Geor-
gia Osteopathic Hospital, Inc., 748 F2d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir 1984).
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tiffs would not request it. 159 Thus, the prospective remedy is sup-
ported by the language in § 7(b) of the ADEA allowing courts to
grant such legal or equitable relief as is necessary to further the
purposes of the Act.
The availability of the front pay remedy is one example of
why Congress included the broad remedial language in § 7(b).
Compensation for "lost wages" under the ADEA can be much
more complex than a backpay award under the FLSA. The broad
remedial language ensures that "amounts owing" is not construed
narrowly to prevent age discrimination victims from being fully
compensated for all pecuniary losses, including items not easily
characterized as "wages." Courts have used Congress's implicit au-
thorization of a broad definition of "wages" to award ADEA plain-
tiffs prospective salary increases and bonuses. 60 Courts will also
include commission income in a backpay award if a plaintiff can
establish entitlement with sufficient certainty. 161 In addition,
courts have awarded ADEA victims lost life insurance 62 and pen-
sion 6 s benefits. Finally, courts have included unrealized profits on
employee stock option plans, the value of health insurance, ac-
crued sick leave, and other fringe benefits in backpay compensa-
tion awards when the availability of such benefits is not overly
speculative.'6 4
The above list illustrates the utility of the broad remedial lan-
guage in § 7(b). Congress realized that the kinds of economic losses
resulting from ADEA violations would evolve over time, and the
text of the statute allows the courts to deal effectively with
changed circumstances and complex compensation schemes. The
Vazquez court recognized this flexibility and advocated a two-
tiered approach for the determination of available remedies under
the ADEA. 65 First, the court should look to the express provisions
"I' Koyen, 560 F Supp at 1168-69.
160 Taylor v Home Insurance Co., 777 F2d 849 (4th Cir 1985); Kolb v Goldring, Inc.,
694 F2d 869 (1st Cir 1982).
1 Goldstein v Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F2d 1435 (11th Cir 1985).
"' Fariss v Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F2d 958 (4th Cir 1985).
'' Loeb v Textron, Inc., 600 F2d 1003 (1st Cir 1979).
1 Whittlesey v Union Carbide Corp., 35 FEP Cases (BNA) 1085, 1088-89 (S D NY
1983), aff'd, 742 F2d 724 (2d Cir 1984) (profits on stock option plans); Blackwell v Sun
Electric Corp., 696 F2d 1176, 1185-86 (6th Cir 1983) (value of health insurance); Alford v
City of Lubbock, 484 F Supp 1001, 1004-05 (N D Tex 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 664
F2d 1263 (5th Cir 1982) (accrued sick leave); Kolb, 694 F2d at 874 (employee expense ac-
count, clothing discount). See Blackwell, 696 F2d at 1185 for discussion of speculativeness
(court did not allow recovery for greater prospective earnings because of expanded sales
territory).
16" Vazquez, 579 F2d at 112 (construing ADEA to proscribe damages for pain and suf-
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of the ADEA to determine whether they clearly cover the re-
quested relief. If they do not, under the authority granted by the
broad statutory language the court should ask whether the re-
quested relief would further all of the purposes of the Act, includ-
ing the preference for conciliation over litigation."0 6 If this second
requirement is met, the court can grant the requested relief.
Thus, a survey of ADEA case law provides precedent for a
purposive construction of the Act in determining the financial re-
sponsibility of unions for discriminatory conduct. The cases dis-
cussing the remedial provisions of the ADEA focus on finding the
type of relief that accomplishes the objectives of the statute. 6 7 The
language borrowed from the FLSA is an important consideration
in the courts' analyses, but it has not been deemed determinative.
Since the ADEA's text does not clearly resolve the issue of union
liability for damages, an interpretation that refers to the purposes
and history of the Act is justified and perhaps required.
C. Further Support for Selective Incorporation: Legislative
Histories
The legislative history of the ADEA provides strong support
for the interpretation of § 7(b) advocated by this comment. As dis-
cussed earlier, the sponsors of the Act focused on the efficiency of
using the FLSA's established bureaucracy to administer the age
discrimination statute."1 8 The noted advantages were ease of ad-
ministration and the familiarity of industry with the procedures of
the FLSA. The construction of § 7(b) of the ADEA proposed by
this comment is consistent with the Congressional emphasis on the
advantages of FLSA procedure, since it would require adherence to
the procedural mechanisms included in the FLSA.
The proposed interpretation is also supported by statements
in the legislative history expressing a preference for enforcement
by conciliation.6 9 This construction of the Act allows a plaintiff to
bring a private action against the union but limits the available
remedies to compensation for pecuniary loss. The limited damages
fering but noting that the decision could change if the need for additional remedies became
apparent).
166 Id.
167 Id; Rogers, 550 F2d at 834; Dean v American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F2d 1036 (5th Cir
1977) (all denying non-pecuniary damages under the ADEA after analyzing whether the
remedy would further the purposes of the Act).
16 See notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
16 S Rep No 723, 90th Cong, 1st Sess 5 (1967) (committees emphasized conciliation
and persuasion as means of enforcement).
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available under this reading of the Act do not significantly increase
an employee-plaintiff's incentive to litigate rather than go through
the administrative agency. 170 The legislative history of the Equal
Pay Act also supports the proposed construction of the enforce-
ment provision of the ADEA. The history of the EPA indicates
that Congress intended courts to assess damages against unions for
statutory violations.1 7 1 The EPA is analogous to the ADEA for two
reasons. First, the statutes have comparable substantive provisions
which proscribe certain discriminatory condiict by unions and em-
ployers. Second, Congress passed both statutes as amendments to
the FLSA out of concern for efficient enforcement and ease of
administration. 72
D. Final Support: The Purposes and Context of the ADEA.
The purposes of the ADEA and the importance of ensuring
their effectuation through a thoughtful interpretation of the stat-
ute have been discussed throughout this comment. Congress en-
acted the ADEA to prohibit and deter arbitrary age discrimination,
emphasizing the use of conciliation and persuasion where possi-
ble. 73 The refusal of some courts to impose monetary liability on
discriminatory unions does not further any of these purposes. In
fact, to the extent it fails to deter union violations, it hinders ac-
complishment of the Act's objectives. Imposing financial responsi-
bility on unions for their discriminatory conduct would cause un-
ions to "internalize" the costs of their discrimination and would
ensure that they assign adequate importance to the eradication of
age discrimination in negotiating and administering a collective
bargaining agreement. 74
Imposing backpay liability on unions is not inconsistent with
Congress's expressed preference for conciliation and persuasion as
the means of enforcing the statute. Congress enacted the provision
authorizing private enforcement actions as a necessary supplement
to agency conciliation efforts. The availability of a backpay remedy
170 The availability of some sort of damages against a union will create an incentive for
the union to conciliate with the employee rather than go through litigation. Unions have no
apparent incentive to avoid litigation if there is no possibility of financial liability. See Vaz-
quez, 579 F2d at 111 (applying a similar argument to employers).
171 See note 62-64 and accompanying text.
171 See notes 38-43, 65-66 and accompanying text.
173 See note 14 and accompanying text.
174 See Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 Harv L Rev 702 (1980)
(a similar argument for holding unions liable for signing discriminatory collective bargaining
agreements under Title VII).
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against the union is necessary to ensure full compensation to the
injured plaintiff, and may actually decrease the possibility of a
trial. Potential liability for monetary damages will give unions
strong incentive to avoid trial and go through the conciliation
process.
Moreover, while the ADEA expresses a preference for concilia-
tion, in practice most cases have not been settled by this mecha-
nism. 175  Therefore, the overriding concern of the
ADEA-eliminating age discrimination-will only be fully effectu-
ated through private enforcement of the Act. Plaintiffs injured by
unions will have far more incentive to enforce the substantive pro-
visions of the statute if compensation for their economic losses is
available. The proposed interpretation of the statute rectifies this
problem by providing compensation to ADEA plaintiffs injured by
unions, thus facilitating enforcement of the Act.
The proposed selective incorporation of FLSA remedies into
the ADEA would also harmonize the language of the statute with
its context. Courts that refuse to assess damages against unions
under the ADEA ignore the different legislative purposes underly-
ing the FLSA and ADEA. Labor unions were not included in the
substantive provisions of the original FLSA because they were not
part of the problem the FLSA was designed to redress. 176 In con-
trast, Congress recognized that unions were part of the age dis-
crimination problem and drafted the ADEA to cover union con-
duct.177 The different rationales behind the FLSA and ADEA
militate against a wooden application of the remedial provisions of
the FLSA to ADEA claims.
Finally, imposing damages on a union that has violated the
ADEA harmonizes employment discrimination law and the duty of
fair representation doctrine. The availability of union damages
under the ADEA would make the statute the preferable alternative
for employees victimized by union discrimination. Under either an
ADEA action or a duty of fair representation suit, the union would
be liable for backpay, attorney's fees, and court costs. An ADEA
action, however, is less burdensome for plaintiffs,'178 and aims di-
rectly at age discrimination. Thus, an interpretation of the ADEA
that allows an assessment of damages against unions better pro-
tects the rights of workers to be free from arbitrary discrimina-
1 See note 144.
17' See notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
177 See notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
"I See notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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tion-a shared goal of both employment discrimination law and
the duty of fair representation doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The ADEA has been described with good reason as a "hybrid"
statute. Incorporating language from a variety of enactments, the
Act is not a model of legislative clarity. Given this textual ambigu-
ity and the Act's status as an amendment to the FLSA, the ADEA
must be read carefully and in accordance with its history and
purposes.
This comment has argued that the rigid incorporation of all
FLSA provisions, including the provision foreclosing damages
against unions, is not warranted. It has proposed a reading of the
text of the ADEA that emphasizes the "selective incorporation" of
FLSA procedures into the Act, giving courts wide discretion to cre-
ate remedies that will ensure plaintiffs full compensation for their
pecuniary losses. This remedial flexibility is limited by the require-
ment that the relief awarded under the ADEA accord with the
FLSA, compensating for economic damages only. Limited in this
fashion, the authorization in the ADEA to grant remedies that will
further the purposes of the Act justifies an imposition of financial
liability on unions.
1989] 1119

